4 Chinese ships entered Japan territorial waters near Senkaku

SenkakuShips of the People’s Republic of China once again entered Japanese territorial waters off the disputed Senkaku or Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea.

Iran’s Press TV reports (via GlobalSecurity.org) that Japan’s Coast Guard says four Chinese ships have sailed into Japan-controlled waters of the Senkaku islands (known as Diaoyu by China) on Oct. 1. 2013 — the 64th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

Tokyo has long been engaged in a dispute with Beijing over the sovereignty of the uninhabited islands.

The incident also came as US Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel are expected to meet their Japanese counterparts in Tokyo two days later on Oct. 3 to discuss operational arrangements for the alliance between the two sides.

Previous similar incidents include:

  • On September 27, China sent a fleet of four vessels for patrolling territorial waters surrounding the disputed chain of islands.
  • On September 14, four Chinese ships entered Japan’s territorial waters.
  • In late April 2013, eight Chinese vessels entered the disputed waters, which led Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to say that Tokyo would “expel by force” any Chinese individuals landing on the islands.

On September 11, 2012, Tokyo signed a deal to buy three of the islands from their private Japanese owner in line with plans to nationalize the archipelago.

The islands are located near a crucial shipping lane and give the owner exclusive oil, mineral and fishing rights in the surrounding waters.

Last month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that his country is ready to talk to Japan over the maritime row if Tokyo declares the islands to be disputed.

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2 responses to “4 Chinese ships entered Japan territorial waters near Senkaku

  1. A. James Gregor, Ph.D. & Professor

    Given the character of CODA, readers who are seriously committed to the security interests of the United States would profit from comments tendered by those interlocutors who have expertise in weapons systems and the order of battle of protagonists, particularly in the regions in which state actors are engaged. For example, the defense officials of Taiwan have maintained that the armed forces of the island nation can deter the forces of mainland China. Given the investments made in the armed forces of People’s Republic of China in terms of short, medium, and long range missiles, strike, and air superiority aircraft, as well as blue-water, missile capable surface vessels, together with a respectable contingent of modern submersibles–how plausible is the Taiwanese claim? If it is not plausible, why not? And if not, How large a consortium of allies would be required to deter PRC attacks on Taiwan and associated sealines of communication (presumably vital to all democratic, industrialized nations)? To render such a claim in the least plausible, would a consortium dedicated to the deterrence of PRC aggression require the direct involvement of the United States? The readers of CODA (and there are increasing numbers in Asia, the region toward which the present administration in Washington is purportedly “pivoting”) could only profit from the contribution of those specialists in weaponry and military strategy who have lent their names to the present enterprise.

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  2. Well, my oh-so-pithy comment is that apparently the Japanese government actually doesn’t really mind the Chinese incursions into Japanese territorial waters. If they actually did, then they’d have grown a pair a year ago and actually militarily confronted all these Chinese invasions of Japanese waters.

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